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The Global Correspondence Principle: A Generalization 
By JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, RICHARD A. BRECHER, AND TATSUO HATTA* 
This paper generalizes the Global Correspondence Principle by extending, in two 
major ways, Paul Samuelson's 1971 analysis of the exchange rate response to an 
international purchasing-power transfer. We analyze the price effect of a shift in 
any parameter, not necessarily a transfer. We then explore the resulting adjust-
ments in any non price variable such as welfare. As our analysis shows, the 
direction of these adjustments depends neither on whether they are small or large 
nor on whether equilibrium is locally stable or unstable. , 
The celebrated Correspondence Principle 
of Paul Samuelson (1947) highlighted the 
importance of local stability for deriving 
fruitful theorems in comparative statics based 
on "small" changes. Thus, theorists typically 
qualify their comparative-static conclusions 
with the proviso that equilibrium is locally 
stable. 
As Samuelson (1971) subsequently pointed 
out, however, the comparative-static effects 
of a parametric shift upon relative prices do 
not depend qualitatively on whether the ini-
tial equilibrium is locally Walras stable, pro-
vided that Walrasian tatonnement is invoked 
and "large" adjustments are taken properly 
into account. Thus, using Samuelson's recent 
(1983) terminology, we have the Global Cor-
respondence Principle. 
Samuelson's 1971 paper dealt explicitly 
with the case of an international pur-
chasing-power transfer in a two-country, 
two-good model. He examined the effect of a 
transfer upon the exchange rate, that is, the 
price variable whose disequilibrium behavior 
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is directly specified by the adjustment mech-
anism postulated in the mode1. l 
First, we shall analyze the global response 
of price to a shift in any parameter (not 
necessarily a transfer payment) within the 
two-good, general equilibrium model. Then, 
more remarkably, we shall also establish that 
the corresponding responses of nonprice 
variables, such as welfare, are qualitatively 
independent of both the magnitude of ad-
justment and the question of local stability. 
This result extends the Global Correspon-
dence Principle to cover variables other than 
price. The extension enables us to prove 
that, in a two-agent, two-good world, a 
transfer of income always improves the re-
cipient'S welfare-regardless of whether the 
initial equilibrium is stable, and irrespective 
of the magnitude of the transfer. In this way 
we generalize Samuelson's (1947) well-known 
proposition that the recipient's welfare im-
proves provided that the initial equilibrium 
is stable. To take another example, our anal-
ysis can also be utilized to show that local 
stability can be dropped from Bhagwati's 
(1958) well-known set of conditions for im-
miserizing growth. 
In Section I, we set up the model and 
analyze the global effect of a parametric shift 
on the relative price. In Section II, the shift's 
lWe may mention that the original draft of our 
present paper also happened to develop a global analy-
sis of price changes in relation to the transfer problem. 
Samuelson was kind enough to draw our attention to 
the fact that his 1971 paper had already anticipated our 
findings. The present draft is thus focused on two other 
aspects of global analysis, as explained in the text. 
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effect on nonprice variables will be studied 
and our main results proved. Section III 
applies our results of, Section II specifically 
to the example of a transfer payment. Con-
cluding remarks are offered in Section IV. 
I. Price Effects 
We adopt the standard competitive model 
of an economy in which two goods, X and 
Y, are produced and consumed. Let the 
economy's aggregate excess demand func-
tion for good X be x(p, 0), where p is the 
relative price of this good, and 0 is a shift 
parameter. This generic model can be inter-
preted in many different ways. For e;~ample, 
p and x may be domestic price and excess 
demand for X in a single-country economy, 
with 0 representing a sales tax, an internal 
transfer betw(~n agents of the country, or 
the endowment of a factor. Alternatively, in 
the case of more than one country, p and x 
may be the international terms of trade and 
world excess demand, while 0 could be an 
import tariff, an international transfer or 
domestic productivity. 
The condition for market equilibrium is 
(1) x(p,O) =0. 
To guarantee existence of a positive equi-
librium price, we make the following as-
sumption: 
ASSUMPTION 1: The junction x(p,O) is 
continuous with respect to each of its argu-
ments, and for each val!!e of 0 in the relevant 
domain there exist a 'i and a p such that 
x(p, 8) < 0 for all p ~ p and x(p, 0) > 0 for 
a11p ~ p. 
To cover situations of disequilibrium, ~we 
postulate a dynamic adjustment process • of 
Walrasian titonnement, charact~rized by ~he 
following assumption: ' ! 
ASSUMPTION 2: When market-clearing 
condition (1) is not satisfied, p continuously 
increases or decreases as x(p, 0) ~ 0, respec-
tively, ceasing to change when x(p, 0) = O. 
We can now show that the direction of 
change in the price ratio depends only on the 
sign of the aggregate excess demand created 
by the parametric shift at the initial equi-
librium price. This result is stated as the 
following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1: In the model charac-
terized by equation (1) and Assumptions 1 
and 2, suppose that x(po, 0°) == 0 for some 
pair (pO,Oo) of p and O. Let 0 be shifted 
from 0° to 0' where x(pO, 0') =1= O. Then the 
price will reach a new equilibrium value, de-
noted p', such that 
(2) (p' - pO)x(pO, 0') > O. 
PROOF: 
First suppose that 
(3) 
Then, from Assumption 2, p' must be the 




Since Assumption 1 ensures that x(p, 0') > 
o for a p < pO, the Intermediate Value Theo-
rem and inequality (3) together imply that 
there is at least one value of p satisfying 
both conditions (4) and (5). Denoting the 
highest such value p', and invoking Assump-
tion 2, we find that p' is the new equi-
librium price. Thus, inequalities (3) and (5) 
yield (2). Similar reasoning establishes this 
proposition in the alternative case where 
x(po, 0') > 0 instead of inequality (3). 
Proposition 1 states that the price in-
creases if and only if the parametric shift 
creates a positive excess demand at the ini-
tial equilibrium price. Moreover, this result 
holds for large as well as small parametric 
changes of any kind, and regardless of 
whether local stability obtains, in our two-
good model with Walrasian titonnement. 
Correspondingly, the conditions that have 
been derived in the comparative-static theo-
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retica1literature for determining price change 
from the sign of x(po, 0') following specific 
parametric shifts, and that have been consid-
ered valid only for small changes from a 
locally Walras-stable equilibrium, are equally 
valid globally. That is, these conditions hold 
for changes of any size, with or without lo-
cal stability. For example, the well-known 
transfer problem criterion for price adjust-
ments-according to which the donor's terms 
of trade will improve or worsen as the sum 
of the marginal propensities to consume im-
portables of the two countries is respectively 
greater or less than unity2-is immediately 
seen to hold globally, and not just for small 
changes from a locally stable equilibrium as 
conventionally established. 
Figure 1 illustrates why Proposition 1 
holds even when the initial equilibrium is 
unstable. The solid and dashed curves re-
spectively represent the aggregate excess de-
mand function for good X after and before 
the parametric shift. Since the dashed curve 
is drawn upward sloping at pO, the initial 
equilibrium is unstable. (To avoid cluttering 
the diagram, most of this curve is not shown.) 
At pO, the shift in 0 then creates an excess 
supply of good X in the case depicted. Thus, 
the price of this good falls by Walrasian 
tatonnement to p', the new equilibrium.3 
By contrast, the traditional technique of 
differential calculus evidently cannot be used 
to infer the shift of an unstable equilibri-
um, since a small change in 0 at such an 
equilibrium will lead to a large adjustment 
in p. The calculus technique leads to the fol-
lowing well-known formula derived from 
equation (1): 
(6) dp/dO = - x(J/xp ' 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
At an unstable equilibrium, we have Xp > 0, 
20f course, this condition on marginal propensities 
determines the sign of excess demand created at the 
initial equilibrium price (i.e., the sign of x(po, 8'» when 
the specific parametric shift is a transfer. 
3If the solid curve were slightly redrawn to touch 
(rather than cross) the vertical axis at p' -in which case 
the new equilibrium would no longer be fully stable-the 
essence of our above argument would be unaffected. 
p 
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in which case dp/dO> 0 when Xg < o. Thus, 
in Figure 1, we can interpret formula (6~ as 
simply telling us that a price rise from p to 
p would be necessary to eliminate the excess 
supply created (at the initial price) by a 
parametric shift from 0 ° to 0'. It would, 
however, be wrong to infer, as some state-
ments in the literature by many can suggest, 
that p will in fact be the new equilibrium in 
this case. Given the Walrasian price-adjust-
ment mechanism, p will actually fall in re-
sponse to the excess supply. Hence p will 
not be the new equilibrium price; rather, the 
price will adjust globally to p' in this case. 
To put the matter somewhat differently, 
contrary to customary interpretations, it is 
sufficient to look at the sign on the numera-
tor alone in formula (6) to determine the 
direction of change in the terms of trade, in 
the event of a small parametric shift. For Xg, 
the numerator, is nothing but the excess 
demand at initial terms of trade when 0 
shifts; that is, it corresponds to x(po, 0') in 
formula (2). As Proposition 1 shows, more-
over, the sign of this excess demand exclu-
sively determines the direction of change in 
the terms of trade, that is, the sign of (p'-
pO) in formula (2). Thus, the sign of the 
denominator in formula (6), that is, of xp ' or 
equivalently the stability term, is irrelevant 
Copyright © 2001 All Rights Reserved 
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to the direction of price change: T1ie:crinven-
tional Criteria 'for terms-of-trade adjustment 
under different parametric'shifts, which re-
late to the :sign of the numerator in ,foimula 
(6) and have been stated as'valjd subject to 
Walras-stability restriction Ito sign" the de-
'nominator in formula (61" aretlierefore valid 
quite generally.", i.; ,I , 
, I"' 
D. WeHare and Othei Nonpriee EffeCts' , 
Proposition 1, ,like' Samuelson's Global 
Correspondence Principle, charact¢ze~. the 
'global effect, of a parametric shifi'upon ithe 
price variable: An intriguing question is: 'can 
the Global Correspondence Principle also'be 
extended to 'the effects on nonprice vari-
fables? For 'example,' the criteria 'for 'de-
'U~tmiiling 'the effects" of transfers or growth 
on a 'country's welfare have been established, 
'invoking again Walras stability.' Can these 
r~sults' also be shown to be independent 'of 
:such a stability restriction? If so, 'the demon-
stration would be truly reIrtarkable, since the 
dynanii~ adjustment behavior is Specified' on 
'prices,' not on the 'nonprice variables. 
In - this' section, we indeed demonstrate 
that the criteria established for changes in 
nonprice variables ii:t' response to a small 
parametric shift; using differential, 'calculus 
methods and' considered valid in the 'pres_ 
ence of Walras stability, are valid in the 
global context under certain reasonable con-
ditions. ." /, ~ -j' 
, To carry but this deIrtonstratiOll, we' t.esdh 
to an analogue of the technique utilized In' 
the price-change problem above, where 4e 
excess demand induced; by the paranietnc 
shift at initial prices (Le., x(po, fJ'» p~ay\X1 
the key role. Since the objective 110\'1 lis' ~ 
analyze nonpri(""e change instead, we reassign' 
this role to eXC(!Ss demand at the initial value 
of the nonprice variable. To maintain the 
value of the nonprice variable at the initial' 
,level, of cours(!, we' shall assume that price' 
adjusts as r~uired (to a level'to be 'denoted, 
as p * below). Thus, for example, if welfare, 
: is the nonprice variable and domestic growth 
is the shift parameter, the focus now wOu'ld 
be on the excess demand where the price has 
been adjusted (to p*) toleave welfare un-
changed after growth. 
The criteria'derived by examining the~fac­
,tors governing the sign of this excess de-
'mand Ilt constant' valUe of the nonprice vari-
'able correspond then'to the ones' stated as 
the conventional comparative-static resUlts, 
llsmg'~ differential calculus methods.' AI-
-fhouglt 'these traditional results are "stated as 
valid pro'Vided; that Walras stability obtains, 
bur analysis' below will demonstrate that the 
results so derived are valid globally and in-
'dependently of local stability, under 'specific 
restrictions."";' ' , 
Our demonstratiori'pr6Ceeds'by first deriv-
ing the' conventional; differential calculus 
results ,for', nonprice-vanable change in a 
general form, for any'shift parameter, equiv-
alently to, the price-change formula (6). We 
then examine the precise manner in which 
these results generalize in the global context, 
'thlit is, for large changes and regardless of 
Walras stability. . " . [ ,.;, 
~, " A.' Local EJfects'Reconsidered 't , 
, ,\' , 
'First, w~, ihtroduce the' necessary terminol-
ogy. Let u deriote' the nonpriee variable that 
we examine, and suppose that it is function-
ally dependent on both p andfJ, as follows: 
" - ; 
(7) ,. ", u='v(p,fJ}. ' 
We call the' dll-ect impact of (J ,upon' u the 
"primary ,'impact'" (given I: b~ ~(~O, e~)Jo.., 
v(po, eo» and the,indirect impac~ ~~ (Jupo~ 
u ttu:ough p the "second~ lIDp~~tl' (lJ~f,'; 
8'):- v(po, e'». When pnmary Midlsecond~ 
,aryiimpacts are opposite in directionl and the , 
I latter outweighs the former, we1s 'I llsay thai I, 
Ithei:pverall effect on u is "p ~~dxicalr 
IOtli~se, the overall~effect 't::ioorcalled 
1 '·n~hnll1." ,-' ' Ii:, II . I, 
" 
, . I, ;;:,}; id, " , ' 
, 4 It should be stated that the comparative-static re-
sults on welfare have typically been derived directly, 
rather than by using the technique of investigating 
,excess demand at constant value of the 'nonprice vari-
able ..... a technique that we use to advantage here in 
generaliting the Global Correspondence Principle to the 
'nonprice domain. Bhagwati's (1958) analysis of bnmis-
erizing growth (and, more recently,' several analyses of 
'.international transfers) did, ,however, use the technique 
that we further develop 'here, 
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Fpr example, we may interpret u and 8 as 
,the welf~e level an~ the transfer. receipt, 
respectively, pf pne .CC?,untry ,in. the stanl;iard 
model pf internatipnal trade. Then Ahe 
primary impact 'is the direct effect: .}?f , the 
transfer uppn the recipient's welf~ a1 cpn-
stant terms pf trade, and the secondaiy im-
pact is the transfer-induced ,terms-pf-trad,e 
effect. Since the primary effect increases .u 
in this case, the paradpx iniplies. a terms-
pf-trade deteripratipn so. great as to. make 
the pverall effect pn u negative. Other exam-
ples pf paradpxes defined in: tills ,way 
are Bhagwati's ,immiserizing grpwth, pr a 
welfare Ipss. from abolishing a tariff. 
Now, deftnethe function x by,' 
(8) x(p,u) ~x[p,c(p,u)L • 
where 8 =: c(p,u) is the inverse functi~n of 
equation (7) with respect to. 8.5 -
Then, in view of equation (1) and identity 
(8), the equilibrium values of p and u must 
satisfy x(p, u) = O. Thus, we pbtain du/dp 
= - xp/xu' This result and equation (6) then 
yield qu/d8 = (du/dp)dp/d8 = x,xp/ 
xuxp' Hence, noting that identity (8) implies 
that Xu = x,cu' we have (du/d8)cu= xp/xp. 
Since the sign of cu indicates the directipn of 
the primary impact, a paradox implies that 
(du/d8)cu < O. Now, xp < 0 is the Walras-
stability assumptipn. Therefore, we' get the 
central result, that, for small changes in. the 
pr~sence pf local stability, .' 
(9) 
is a necessary and sufficient conditipn fora 
paradoxical outcome. In other words, Xi ~ 0 
is a necessary and sufficient condition tpr a 
normal outcome, when Walras stability is 
assumed. 
Analyses pf specific parametric shifts then 
relate to. xp , which ~s the shift-~duced change 
SWhen equation (7) can be interpreted as an indirect 
utility function, c(p, u) is the corresponding .expendi-
ture function. When 8 is interpreted as the transf~r 
receipt and u. the welfare of the recipient agent, then. 
c(p, u) is the expenditure function minus the revenue 
function of this agent; we called this differenre. the 
overspending function in our 1983 article. 
in ·excess'. demand at .constant u. Thus, 
Bhagwati, who analyzed the paradpx of im-
miserizing growth, found thatxp > 0 could 
arise frpm ultra-biased expansion pr inelastic 
demand, despite Wa1ras stability. ¥oreover, 
.to. pbtain. Samuelspn's (1947) result that a 
transfer b'etw~n two agents engaged in free 
trade could not yield welfare paradoxes in 
the presen~ of Walras stability, we could 
show. that necessarily xp < 0 in this case. 
.B •. Global Effects 
:~. Gait .fp~~a (~) ,~e generaliZed tq cover 
Q<?th ll;U'ge (as well as small) parametric 
,changes and situations where Walras stabil-
ity does not obtain? In the general case)' we 
shall show (via Proposition. 4) that when (9) 
is suitably rewritten in equivalent noncalcu-
Ius terms, it becomes only a necessary (but 
npt sufficient) condition for a paradox to 
arise (and hence x p. ~ 0 becomes correspond-
.ingly a sufficient, but not necessary, condi-
tion for a nponal outcome). Also, if we add 
~ertain.restrictions (to rule out multiple val-
ues of p '" ~d. to ensure monotonicity in the 
relationship pf. ~.;to p), the noncalculus ver-
sion pf (9) yan indeed be shown (via Lemma 
2 and Proposition 3) to become a necessary 
and sufficient condition -for a paradox .. 
We proceed by first obtaining the follow-
. ing lemma: " 
.,' 
LEMMA 1: A necessary condition fort/:le 
overall effect of 8 ; upon u to be paradoxical is 
that 
(10) (p' - p"')(p'" - pO) > 0, 
for a p'" satisfying " 
eU)' , 'v(p~, 8') :." ~_(p·o~·(}O). 
PROOF: , , 
Without lossof,.generality, let us assume 
: that the. primary impact pf the parametric 
. shift.is 'rositive in the sense that v( pO, 8') >-
v(po,o. ). When,a paradox occurs, we must 
'then have 
Co ri ht © 2001 All Ri hts Reserved 
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This result and the Intermediate Value The-
orem imply,that there must be a p* between 
pO and p' such that equation (11) is satisfied. 
Thus, we have either po < p* < p' or p' < 
p* < po, which implies inequality (10). 
;, Equation (11) indicates ihat p* is a price 
that would leave welfare at 'the ,initial level 
after the shift in O. Inequality (10) implies 
that such a p* must exist between po and 
p'. In other words, when a paradox occurs as 
a result of a parametric shift, the price must 
pass through p * before it reaches the final 
equilibrium level. 
Intuitive appreciation' of this proposition 
can be strengthened with the help of Figure 
1. Inequalities (12) imply that, after the shift 
in 0, the level of u at po is higher than the 
initial level, while that at p' is lower. Hence, 
between po and p', there must be some level 
of p (denoted p*) causing equation (11) to 
hold and making the level of u equal to the 
initial one. 
Lemma 1 yields the following: 
PROPOSITION 2: A necessary condition for 




for a p * satisfying equation (11). 
PROOF: 
,Take the p'" defined in Lemma 1. Then, 
from the lemma, p* is between po and p'. 
Thus, in view of Assumption 2, the sign of 
the excess demand x( p* , 0') 'at p *. must be 
equal to that of x(p~, 0') created by the 
direct impact of the 'parametric shift. This 
'result and inequality (2) in Proposition 1 
immediately yield (13). 
': Inequality (13) in this proposition---a re-
sult that holds evidently for large and small 
changes regardless of local stability-can 
now be formally related to xp. in (9). 
Since 'x(po, 0°) = 0, and since (p* - po) 
and (p'.'- po) have the same sign when a 
paradox occurs (in view of Lemma 1), in-
equality (13) can be altem'atively written' as 
(14) [x(p*, O')"-"'x(pOj 0°)] 
I(p* - pO) > O. 
Recalling identity (8), we can then rewrite 
condition (14) and hence (13) as 
(15), [x(.p*,UO)-x(pO,UO)] , 
I(p* - pO) > 0, 
where the initial value of u is denoted uo[ e 
v(po,00)].6 Condition (9), however, is noth-
ing but the calculus version of (15) and 
hence of (13) in Proposition 2.7 . 
Therefore, it follows from Proposition 2 
that the conventional necessary condition for 
paradoxical nonprice adjustments (derived 
for small changes and local stability) holds 
equally' for large changes and regardless of 
stability. This proposition immediately im-
plies that Bhagwati's necessary condition for 
immiserizinggrowth holds for changes of 
any magnitude, with or without stability. A 
similar generalization can be developed for 
Samuelson's (1947) theorem regarding the 
impossibility of a welfare-paradoxical trans-
fer (as in Section III below). ' 
Our generalization of the conventional 
comparative-static results is, however, not 
total. While (9) is both a necessary and 
sUfficient condition for a paradox with small 
c;ihanges and local stability, its global coun-
t~rpart ,in terms ·of condition (13) is only 
necessary but not ·sufficient. 
i:i, ,A full generalization is possible, however, 
,!'f:iadded restrictions are imposed. These are 
:11, II II 
',' 'uggested by noting that there are two rea-
,I"psiwhy necessary condition (13) is not 'also 
'1!i:;! I, 
illl!;1 , 
:W'6Note that, from identity (8) we have x(p·, uo) 55 
X[p·; c(p·, uo)] = x(p*,8'). 
: 7Inequality (15) implies that, according to Proposi-
tion 2, x is (on average) an increasing function with 
respect to p in the interval between pO and p* .when 
the overall effect of (J upon u is paradoxical. That is, as 
the price is increased (decreased) from po to p., the 
excess demand has to increase (decrease) if (J is ad-
justed to keep u constant at uO. 
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a sufficient condition for a paradox.: First, 
even when (13) holds, p. may fail to satisfy 
inequality (10) in Lemma 1; that is, p. 
may not lie between pO and p'. Hence, a 
normal outcome may arise. This situation 
would occur in Figure 1 if p. were relo-
cated to lie between p" and p, still leaving 
x(p·,O') < O. , 
Second, even if inequality (13) holds for a 
p. satisfying (10), a normal result may arise 
if v(p, 0') is not monotonic with respect to 
p. To, see this possibility in Figure 1, note 
that (by definition) the price movement from 
pO to p. keeping 0 at 0' would just offset 
the primary impact on u. Thus, if v(p, 0') is 
monotonic with respect to p, the further 
price movement from p·to p' will continue 
to change u in the same direction; that is, 
. the secondary will now outweigh the primary 
impact, necessarily creating a paradox. This 
outcome need not arise, however,' if v(p,O') 
,is not monotonic, as may happen in the case 
when u represents welfare and distortions 
are present. 
Thus, we immediately have the following: 
J" , 
LEMMA 2: Assume that v(p,O') is mono-
tonic with r.espect to p in the interval between 
pQ and p'. Then a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the overall effect of 0 upon u to 
be paradoxical is that inequality (10) hold for 
a p. satisfying equation (11). 
This lemma yields the following: 
PROPOSITION 3: Assume that: (i) the 
junction, v(p, 0') is monotonic with respect to 
p, so that p. is unique; (ii) the primary and 
secondary impacts of the shift from 0° to 0' 
are opposite in direction (since otherwise a 
paradox would clearly be impossible);. and 
(iii) the shift from 0° to 0' is small enough to 
insure that x(p,O') does not change sign 
more than once between pO and p •. Then, 
inequality (13) is f;l necessary, and, sufficient 
condition for the overall effect of 0 upon u to 
be paradoxical. ' 
PROOF: 
In view of Proposition 2 and Lemma '2, 
,we only have to prove that inequality (13) 
implies (10) under the assumptions of 
.the present,proposition. Now. suppose ·that 
the function x(p,O') changes sign between 
pO and p. e1{actly once. Then we have 
x(po, O')x(p.,.O') ~ O. This result and"in-
equality (13) yield (p' ~ pO)x(p~, 0') ~ 0, a 
contradiction of (2). In view of Proposition 
3; assumption (iii), therefore, ~ the function 
x(p, 0') cannot in fact change sign between 
pO and p •. Thus, J" must be outside the 
interval between _ p and p., which means 
that 
On the other hand,we know -that (p'-
pO)(p. _ pO) > 0 from assumption (ii). This 
result and inequality (16) immediately yield 
(10). " 
, 
Proposition 3, we may remark, does not 
,revert trivially to local analysis. It is im-
portant to realize that restricting attention,to 
small shifts in 0 does not automatically im-
ply small adjustments in p and u. More 
specifically, if the initial equilibrium is un-
stable, these adjustments will be large even 
. when the parametric shift is infinitesimal. 
Thus, our analysis is still global in essence. 
m. An Application: Transfers and WeHare 
Samuelson (1947) proved that a purchas-
ing-power transfer from donor to recipient 
never has a paradoxical effect on welfare in 
the standard two-agent, two-good model if 
the initial equilibrium is Walras stable. Our 
Proposition 2. now enables us to establish 
that his -theorem is valid regardless of· the 
magnitude of the transfer and the stability of 
initial'equilibrium.8 ' , 
Let an increase in 0 represent a purchas-
ing-power transfer from the donor to the 
recipient~ and ha~e u denote the utility level 
of the latter agent. Without loss of generality 
we may assume that, in trading with the 
donor, the recipient is a net Seller of good X. 
8See ~S<? our (1984) ,Theorem 3 and o~ r~lated 
discussion of Yves ~alasko (19~8). ,Recall that the anal-
ysis of the' transfer proble!D was the, fertile ground for 
Samuelson (1971) and us (in our original version of the 
present paper) to raise the global issues discussed here. 
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be greater at D than at C. In light of this 
information, reapplication of the Hicks theo-
rem implies that D cannot lie below the pO 
line. Therefore, noting that E does lie below 
this line (by convexity once again), we con-
clude that D must be located southeast of E. 
In other words, the necessary condition (13) 
for a welfare paradox is not satisfied, since 
(p' - pO) < 0 and x(p·, 8') > O. 
Hence, Proposition 2 implies that the 
transfer's overall effect on welfare is nor-
mal. 10 This result, moreover, holds for a 
transfer of any magnitude, regardless of 
whether the initial equilibrium is stable. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
The present paper has generalized· the 
Global Correspondence Principle by extend-
ing, in two major ways, Samuelson's 1971 
analysis of the exchange-rate response to 
Noting that the primary impact of the trans- an international purchasing-power transfer. 
fer upon it is clearly positive, we suppose First, we analyzed the price effect of a para-
that the secondary impact is negative, since metric shift by allowing the shift to occur in 
otherwise the possibility of a paradox would any parameter, not necessarily a transfer 
be trivally precluded. payment. Second, we explored the resulting 
In Figure 2, curve AB is the produc- adjustments in any nonprice variable such as 
tion-possibility frontier for the two-agent welfare. As our analysis showed, the direc-
economy as a whole; point C is the initial tion of these adjustments is independent of 
equilibrium for aggre%ate production and both their magnitude (small or large) and the 
consumption at price p ; while points E and local nature of equilibrium (stable or unsta-
D represent aggregate production and con- hIe). Thus, yve have generalized the conven-
sumption, respectively, if the recipient's UOlial iUgebra of comparative statics, which 
terms of trade were to deteriorate to p *. (At typically assumes small shifts from a stable 
this stage in the argument, D may be located equilibpUm. . I 
anywhere on the p* line.) Since convexity of. . 'i: What abQut "higher dimensioniilit1'? Our 
the production-possibility set ensures that C, .. : generalization is by no means Iimlted :to two 
lies below the p * line, a well-known theorem· .! ~gents.! In fact,· Proposition 1 is really about 
due to John Hicks (1940)9 implies::that no ilie;aggregate economy, withoutrefer~nce to 
distribution of bundle C can imake; ~otb fue:nuinber of agents included; while .Prop-
agents as well off as with the actual distribu- oSltions2 and 3 focus on one agent ~s dis-
tion of bund1e D. Thus, reeaIJ.lng' :that Hnct frOm: the rest of the aggregate ecOnomy, 
v(p*,8') at D equals v(po,80) at C ;(by whose 'underlying composition is not essen-
definition of p * as the welfare-preserving tiano the analysisY 
price in the face of a transfer), we im-
mediately see that the donor's welfare must 
9As Hicks states: "Thus if we start from any actual 
distribution of wealth in the I situation, what the condi-
tion !.Plql > !.Plql tells us is that it is impossible to 
reach, by redistribution, a position in which everyone is 
as well off as he is in the II situation" (p. 111). 
10 This result need not hold if there were tax dis-
tortions, as shown by Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and 
our f.,aper (1985). 
1 The specific analysis of Figure 2, however, is re-
stricted to the two-agent case, for reasons suggested by, 
for example, our paper (1983) and references cited 
therein. 
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Generalization to more than two goods, 
however, is another matter,12 as noted also 
by Samuelson (1971). Under what restric-
tions such a generalization may be possible 
in the many-good case is an interesting ques-
tion for further research. 
12 In the two-good case, the titonnement process is 
always stable if the equilibria are isolated. This special 
property, however, does not hold in general when we 
introduce additional goods. See Kenneth Arrow and 
F.H. Hahn (1971, pp. 282-85). 
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